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Abstract:  
Chinese acquirers spent $38 million on mergers and acquisitions in 1990, and $666.1 billion on 
mergers and acquisitions in 2016. As the Chinese merger market has grown, so too has the literature 
on its performance. Little is known, however, with whom the Chinese can best do business. We aim 
to fill this gap. We suggest that because the liabilities of ‘distance’ ‘foreignness’ and ‘outsideness’ 
complicate acquisition performance, targets in countries and regions which add fewer of these 
liabilities will outperform those that add more. We test this using a sample of 19,766 large (>$10m) 
acquisitions (Jan 1990-Aug 2017), and a sub-sample of 1,542 acquisition for which we could 
calculate performance. We then plot the overseas expansion of Chinese acquirers, and compare the 
performance of Chinese acquisitions, within the Greater China region, within the Confucian cultural 
sphere, and between Asian and the West. In each case, we predict that increasing cultural distance 
decreases performance. Then, because the Continental European governance system is institutionally 
more familiar to the Chinese system than it is to the Anglo-Saxon system, we consider the Chinese 
experience in each of these two systems. Our results largely support our hypotheses, but we also point 
to the limits of the generalizability of existing literature in understanding the Chinese market.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese market for mergers and acquisitions is booming1; in 1990, Chinese acquirers 
spent $38 million on mergers and acquisitions, and in 2016 they spent $661.3 billion.  
As the Chinese merger market has grown, so too has the literature on the performance of 
Chinese mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Peng et al., 1999; Cooke, 2006; Peng, 2006; Xia et 
al., 2008; Yang et al., 2011). A number of scholars have looked at the performance of 
Chinese overseas acquisitions (e.g., Boateng et al., 2008; Chen and Young, 2010) but none, 
to the best of our knowledge, have considered how the location of the target impacts 
performance. In other words, little is known if Chinese acquirers can work better with 
American, European or Asian targets. The purpose of this paper is to address this gap.  
We propose a hierarchy of targets in terms of location and performance expectation. Based 
on the suggestion that international deals are more costly than domestic deals -- because of 
the liabilities of ‘distance’ (Boeh and Beamish, 2012), ‘foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995) and 
‘outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002) – and the observation that cultural and 
institutional differences vary, we propose the following ordering of international targets. 
First, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions, outside of mainland China, but within the Greater 
China Region – that is, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan – will outperform those outside the 
region, because acquisitions within the region will present fewer geographic and cultural 
challenges, and the same institutional challenges that Chinese acquirers will face anywhere 
outside of China. Second, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside of the Greater China 
                                                 
1 See McCarthy et al. (2016). While technically and legally different, terms like ‘merger’, ‘acquisition’, and 
‘takeover’ are used interchangeably. Following the convention, we describe merger and acquisition waves as 
merger waves. We define the Chinese mergers market, furthermore, as the set of deals that involve Chinese 
firms.  
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Region, but within the Confucian world – that is, Japan, Korea and Vietnam – will 
outperform those outside because all the countries in this region share a common Confucian 
foundation (Miles and Goo, 2013), and a social systems that emphasize ‘harmony’ (Alston, 
1989) and ‘reciprocity’ (Lovett et al., 1999; Chung and Hamilton, 2001). Outside of the 
Greater China region, in other words, Confucian targets are the next most familiar. Third, we 
suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside the Confucian world, but still within Asia will 
outperform those in the West, because Asian cultures are more similar to each other – in 
terms of their collectivist and long-term tendencies – than they are to Western cultures – 
which tend to be short-term focused and individualistic (Hofstede, 1984; 2001; 2007). Asian 
target, in other words, will be more familiar to Chinese acquirers and therefore perform 
better. Finally, we suggest that, in the West, ‘Continental European’ targets will outperform 
‘Anglo-Saxon targets’, because while the cultural and geographic distances are high in the 
case of all Western targets, the governance literature (Weimer and Pape, 1999; Cernat, 2004; 
Mueller, 2006) suggests that the Chinese corporate governance system is more similar to the 
Continental European system – employed throughout continental Europe – than it is to the 
Anglo-Saxon – employed in the English-speaking world (Miles and Goo, 2008). Continental 
targets we suggest will be relatively more familiar, institutionally, to Chinese acquirers. 
We test this hierarchy of targets using a sample of 19,766 large (>$10m) Chinese 
acquisitions, announced in the period Jan 1990 - August 2017, and a sub-sample of all 1,542 
acquisitions by stock-listed acquirers, for which we could measure performance.  
We show that the average Chinese deal adds 3.23% to the market value of the acquiring firm, 
and that almost 60% of Chinese acquisitions in the sample created value. This is surprising, 
given that studies using Western samples usually report that 65-85% of mergers and 
acquisitions fail (McCarthy and Dolfsma, 2012).  We show that most Chinese acquisitions 
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are domestic, and with good reason: the average domestic deal adds 2.6% to the market value 
of the acquiring firm. Looking at the international deals we find little evidence to suggest that 
deals within the Greater China region create value, but find that those with the Confusion 
Region, and the wider Asian continent, add value in the way that we would expect. Amongst 
the Western targets, we report that Chinese acquirers prefer Anglo-Saxon targets to 
Continental targets, but show that the Chinese do better deals with Continental targets than 
they do with Anglo-Saxon targets; we report that the Chinese neither create nor destroy value 
with Continental acquisitions, but destroy value with their Anglo-Saxon acquisitions.   
We finish our discussion by reflecting on why some parts of the performance hierarchy are 
supported, while other parts are not, and point to potential future research questions.  In doing 
so we make a number of contributions. Firstly, and because we study the impact of target 
location on acquirer performance, we add to the theory of mergers and acquisitions. Next, 
and because we study Chinese acquisitions, we contribute to the discussion which has been 
dominated by “case studies and descriptive statistics” (Lin et al., 2009, p.1114), and to a 
literature which has “focused … on the USA and UK” (Moschieri and Campa, 2009, p 72).  
 
BACKGROUND 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
An extensive literature documents why mergers might occur (see e.g., Trautwein, 1990; 
Mueller, 1995; Weitzel and McCarthy, 2011). In one of the earliest classifications, Chatterjee 
(1986) suggests that mergers and acquisitions are used to create ‘operative’, ‘financial’, and 
/or ‘collusive’ synergies. Operative synergies are the gains that come from ‘increased 
production and/or administrative efficiencies’, financial synergies are the gains that come 
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from ‘reductions in the cost of capital’, and collusive synergies are the gains that come from 
‘increased market power’ (Chatterjee, 1986, p.121). Subsequent researchers have refined this 
basic model (see e.g., Krishnan et al., 2007; Devos et al., 2008); Houston et al. (2001), for 
example, splits operative synergies into ‘expansionary’ synergies, which are the gains that 
come from an expansion into a new product or regions, and ‘cost-cutting’ synergies, which 
are the gains that come from acquisitions which reduce the acquirers (average) costs. And to 
this model, resource-based scholars have added the gains that come with controlling 
‘strategic assets’ – such as natural, technological, financial, and human resources (e.g., Chen, 
2008) -- and international business scholars have made use of Dunning’s (1980, 1988, 1993) 
OLI paradigm, to suggest that foreign acquisitions may also be motivated by ‘market 
seeking’ gains – which come with access to foreign markets, and the potential that they offer 
for the export of domestic products and for an increase in sales (e.g., Buckley et al., 2007)2.  
The Dangers of Mergers and Acquisitions 
The empirical reality of mergers and acquisitions is, however, somewhat different. After 100 
years of research on ‘the M&A markets of the USA and UK’ (Moschieri and Campa, 2009, p 
72), the impact of a merger on the performance of the acquiring firm is said to be, at best, 
“inconclusive” (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, p.59), and is thought, at worst, to be 
“systematic[ally] detrimental” (Dickerson et al., 1997, p.359). Many mergers are described as 
failures: Puranam and Singh (1999) suggest that between 65 and 85% of all mergers and 
acquisitions fail, and that as many as 50-65% are divested within 5 years, and Houston et al., 
(2001) estimate that only about 60% of predicted cost-cutting synergies, and only about 7% 
of predicted of revenue-expanding synergies are ever realised. Huge sums of money are lost 
                                                 
2 Rich literatures consider which of these factors contribute the most to merger performance (e.g., Houston et 
al., 2001; Devos et al., 2008) and if these factors apply to emerging market firms (e.g., Athreye and Kapur, 
2009; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Gubbi et al., 2010; Li, 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008; Sun et al., 2012). 
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in the process, and huge amounts of shareholder value destroyed. Moeller et al (2005), for 
example, estimates that shareholders lost ‘$216 billion’ in the 1990s on mergers and 
acquisitions (p.758), and concluded that shareholder would ‘have been better off if 
management had simply burned the cash used to pay for the acquisition’ (p.765).  
A large literature suggests that cross-border deals are a particularly troublesome subset of 
mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Chatterjee and Aw, 2000; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Rossi 
and Volpin, 2004; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Levine and Schmukler, 2006; Sarkissian 
and Schill, 2008; Gozzi et al., 2008). This literature argues that while any merger might be 
subject to ‘unforeseen and insurmountable challenges’ (Child et al., 2001), international deal-
makers add the liabilities of ‘distance’ (Boeh and Beamish, 2012), ‘foreignness’ (Zaheer, 
1995) and ‘outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002) to the performance equation.  
Broadly speaking, the ‘liability of distance’ is the costs associated with doing business ‘far 
away’: distance increases transportation (Capron et al., 1998) and monitoring costs 
(Böckerman and Lehto, 2003), obstructs the flow of information and increases information 
asymmetries (Coval and Moskowitz 1999), and it reduces market power (Levy and Reitzes, 
1992) and access to soft information (Hauptman and Hirji 1999). Distance is present, to a 
varying degree, in most mergers and acquisitions. The liabilities of ‘foreignness’ (Zaheer, 
1995) and ‘outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002), however, are two specific sets of costs 
associated with cross-border deals. These are the liabilities that come with doing business 
‘abroad’; the former can be thought of as the costs of learning a new set of rules – both in a 
cultural and institutional sense –and the latter can be thought of as the cost of associated with 
a developing a new network position in a foreign market (Qian et al., 2013; Bell et al., 2012; 
Zaheer, 2002). Both liabilities increase transaction costs, complicate communication 
(Kaurent, 1983; Chevrier, 2003), reduces the quality of the information transferred (Jaffe et 
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al., 1993; Kim, 2009), create uncertainty (Reus and Lamont, 2009), and leads to situations of 
‘them and us’ (Huntington, 1993) which, in turn, increases employee turnover (Krug and 
Hegarty, 1997), and both liabilities have been linked to sub-par cross-border performance.  
The Chinese Merger Market 
It is well known that Chinese merger market has grown rapidly in recent years. It is also well-
known that as it grew the Chinese merger market quickly internationalised (see e.g., MOC, 
2006; 2007; Athreye and Kapur, 2009; UNCTAD, 2011; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013). Rui 
and Yip (2008), for example, report that Chinese acquirers spent a total of $30 billion on 
foreign acquisitions between 1978 and 2002, but spent $57.2 billion in 2005, alone, and a 
further $73 billion alone in 2006. McCarthy and Dolfsma (2012) also report that the number 
Chinese outbound acquisitions increased by a factor of 47 between 2000 and 2011.  
It is perhaps surprising, therefore, to note that most of the literature on Chinese mergers and 
acquisitions only ‘us[es] case studies and descriptive statistics’ (Lin et al., 2009, p.1114), and 
that empirical research on the Chinese merger market only started in the late 1990s (see e.g., 
Peng et al., 1999). Writing in 2011, Yang et al (2011) counts “a total of six previous papers 
[that] deal with M&As in China (Chen and Young, 2010; Cooke, 2006; Lin et al., 2009; 
Peng, 2006; Peng et al., 1999; Xia et al., 2008), [only] three of which use rigorous 
quantitative methods (Chen and Young, 2010; Lin et al., 2009; Xia et al., 2008)” (p.241).  
Because of this, there are significant gaps in our understanding of the way in which the 
Chinese merger market operates, and there is a need for comparative studies (Earley, 1989; 
Tsui et al., 2007; Li and Peng, 2008; Peng and Heath, 1996), ‘in order to test or generalize 
Western findings’ Yang et al (2011, p241). Unfortunately, however, such attempted still 
remain relatively rare (Lu et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2011; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013).  
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The Partner Location Performance Hierarchy  
This paper adds to this gap in our understanding, by considering, effectively, the applicability 
of the literature on cross-border mergers and acquisitions to Chinese acquirers. We reason 
that if differences in language, regulation, currencies, culture and legal systems complicate 
the performance of an international acquisition, and predict superior performance for 
domestic deals, then international deals which alter fewer of these variables will outperform 
those that alter more variables. This reasoning leads us to predict a performance ordering of 
the overseas targets, which we refer to as the partner location performance hierarchy. Table 1 
presents an overview of this hierarchy. The intuition behind it is explained below. 
-- Insert Table 1 Here – 
 
HYPOTHESES 
A rich literature suggests that domestic deals should outperform international deals. 
Theoretically, international deal makers incur the liabilities of ‘distance’ (Boeh and Beamish, 
2012), ‘foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995) and ‘outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002), and 
empirically a large literature suggests that cross-border deals underperform (e.g. Chatterjee 
and Aw, 2000; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005; Levine and Schmukler, 2006; Sarkissian and Schill, 2008; Gozzi et al., 
2008). Because we have no reason to suggest that Chinese acquirers are any more astute at 
dealing with these liabilities, we suggest that the existing literature applies. Thus:  
H1 – Domestic Chinese deals will outperform international Chinese deals 
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Domestic deals are to be preferred, therefore, to international deals. But, clearly, not all 
international deals are equally as troublesome. If the liabilities of distance, foreignness and 
outsideness complicate cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Kogut and Singh, 1998), then 
clearly deals which incur fewer of these liabilities will outperform those that incur more. This 
reasoning leads to a hierarchy of international destinations.  Firstly, we suggest that Chinese 
acquisitions outside of China, but within the Greater China Region – that is, Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan – will outperform those outside of the region. Acquisitions within the 
region, we argue, present Chinese acquirers with fewer geographic and cultural challenges, 
and the same level of institutional challenges than they will face anywhere outside of 
Mainland China; an acquisition in capitalist Hong Kong presents the same institutional 
challenges, we suggest, to a Chinese acquirer as an acquisition in the US or UK. Thus: 
H2 – Deals in the Greater China region will outperform deals outside the region 
Secondly, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside the Greater China Region, but within 
the so-called Confucian cultural sphere – that is, Japan, Korea and Vietnam – will 
outperform those outside that sphere. Acquisitions within that world, we suggest, will present 
fewer cultural challenges, because all the countries in that world are built upon a ‘Confucian’ 
foundation (Miles and Goo, 2013), and share a social systems that emphasize ‘harmony’ – 
epitomized by the Japanese concept of wa (和) – at the group-level (Alston, 1989), and 
‘relationships’ – epitomised by the Chinese concept of guanxi (关系) – at the individual level 
(Lovett et al., 1999; Chung and Hamilton, 2001; Hitt et al., 2002). Outside of the Greater 
China region, in other words, Confucian targets are the next most familiar. Thus:  
H3 – Deals in the Confucian Region will outperform non-Confucian deals 
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Next, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside of the Confucian cultural sphere, but 
within Asia, will outperform those outside of Asia. Asian targets, we reason, will present 
fewer cultural challenges to Chinese acquirers, because Asian cultures are more similar to 
each other – in their tendencies towards collectivist and long-term orientated – than they are 
to Western cultures – which are short-term focused and individualistic (Hofstede, 1984; 
2001; 2007). Asian targets, we suggest, therefore, will be more familiar to Chinese acquirers 
and will be more likely, therefore, to perform better than Western targets. Thus: 
H4 – Asian deals will outperform non-Asian deals 
Finally, and looking at the West, we suggest that ‘Continental’ targets will outperform 
‘Anglo-Saxon targets’, because while the cultural and geographic distances are high in the 
case of all Western targets, the governance literature (e.g. Weimer and Pape, 1999; Cernat, 
2004; Mueller, 2006) suggests that the Chinese corporate governance system is more similar 
to the Continental European’ than it is to the Anglo-Saxon (Miles and Goo, 2008).  In the 
Anglo-Saxon system – used throughout the English-speaking world – the firm is conceived as 
an instrument for creating shareholder value (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Ownership is 
dispersed and shareholders are atomistic, but all shareholders are equally protected (La Porta 
et al., 1998). This, and the fact that the stock market is the stick by which performance is 
gauged, and the stick by which managers are compensated, makes shareholder the most 
significant stakeholders in the Anglo-Saxon system. By contrast, in the Continental system – 
used throughout continental Europe – the firm is considered to be a coalition of various 
participants, all of whom strive for the continuity of the firm as a whole (Moerland, 1995). 
Ownership is concentrated, often in a single family, and employees and debt providers are 
given a significant say in the ways in which the firm is run. This means that shareholders are 
important in the Continental systems, but not more important than any of the other 
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stakeholders. Because of this, Continentals firms tend to be focused on stability and 
continuity, while Anglo-Saxon firms tend to be focused on the creation of short terms gains, 
and on the distribution of those gains to shareholders (Gelauff and Den Broeder, 1996).   
For Chinese acquirers the latter system – the Continental system – is likely to be more 
familiar. In the Chinese system the purpose of the firm is to create an inheritance (Miles and 
Goo, 2013). Ownership tends to be concentrated (Claessens et al., 2000; Carney, et al., 2011), 
often in the hands of a single family, and there is a high degree of overlap between ownership 
and management in most Chinese firms (Ahlstromet al., 2010; Heugens et al., 2009; Liu et 
al., 2011; Peng and Jiang, 2010; Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010; Zhang and Ma, 2009). The 
similarity between Chinese and Continental firms on one hand, and the lack of familiarity of 
Chinese acquirers with the stock market, on the other (Bosiot and Child, 1996; Keister, 1998, 
2009; Li et al., 2008; Yiu et al., 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008; Naughton, 2002), which is all 
important in the Anglo-Saxon world, leads us to suggest that Continental targets will present 
Chinese acquirers with fewer challenges than Anglo-Saxon targets. Thus:  
H5 – Continental deals will outperform Anglo-Saxon targets 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
We test these hypotheses using a data from the Thomson Reuters SDC. We refine it to include 
all deals: (1) announced between Jan 01, 1990 and July 31, 2017; (2) with transaction values 
above US$10 million. We only include deals: (3) for 100% of the target firm’s shares; and (4) 
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deals which do not involve recapitalization, a repurchase of own shares, or a spin-off to 
existing shareholders. Doing so, we create an initial sample of 19,766 acquisitions.  
Target Location  
Using the location of the firm, we program a number of indicator variables.  
First, and to test the first hypothesis – which suggests that domestic Chinese acquisitions will 
outperform international Chinese acquisition – we create: (1) a China indicator that identifies 
Chinese acquirers (A_China) and Chinese targets (T_China); (2) an International indicator 
that differentiates between domestic Chinese deals and international Chinese deals.  
Then, to test the hierarchy of international deals, we programme a number of indicators.  
Firstly, we programme a Greater China Target indicator, which identifies Chinese 
acquisitions in Hong Kong and Macau, and Taiwan with a 1, and all other international 
acquisitions with a 0. Secondly, we programme a Confucian Target indicator, which 
identifies all international targets outside the Greater China Region, but within the Confucian 
cultural sphere -- that is, in Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam – with a 1, and all other 
international acquisitions with a 0. Thirdly, we programme an Asian Target indicator 
variable, which identifies targets within Asia, but outside the Greater China and Confucian 
Regions -- that is, Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand – with a 1, and all other international 
acquisitions with a 0.  Finally, we programme an Anglo-Saxon indicator, which identifies all 
acquisitions in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, as well as their dependencies (such as the Falkland and Guam) with a 1, and all other 
acquisitions outside of Asia with a 0, and a Continental indicator, which identifies all 
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acquisitions in Continental Europe, minus Ireland and the UK, and their dependences (such 
as Gibraltar and the Isle of Man) with a 1, and all other acquisitions outside of Asia with a 0. 
Deal Performance 
Following the majority of merger performance studies (see Zollo and Miere, 2008 for an 
excellent review), we calculate performance using an event study methodology.  
In an event study, a pre-event ‘estimation window’ is defined, and historical data is used to 
forecast the firms ‘normal’ stock price at a future date; this is an expectation of how the 
firm’s stock should have been priced, had the event not occurred. Comparing this ‘forecast’ 
with ‘actual’ data on the firm’s stock price, after the event, provides an indicator of the firms 
‘abnormal’ return; this is the change in the firm’s value, above or below the firm’s expected 
value, which is attributable to the event. Summing the abnormal returns over a period of time, 
known as an ‘event window’, leads to an expression as ‘cumulative abnormal returns’.  
Algebraically, the abnormal return is calculated by identifying the difference between the 
actual returns and normal returns of the acquiring firms. Abnormal return of a security i;  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸[𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡]    (1) 
 
Where Ri,t  is the actual return and E[Ri,t] is the estimated or normal return to the acquiring 
firm. In equation (2) is displayed how the normal return is calculated; 
𝐸𝐸�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� =  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡     (2) 
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Where αi is the intercept coefficient, βi is the slope, Rm,t the formation of the used 
benchmarks, and εi,t is expected to be equal to 0. Summing the abnormal returns to the firm, 
within a predefined event window, produces cumulative abnormal returns:  
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖[𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2] = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡2𝑡𝑡=𝑡𝑡1       (3) 
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm using the standard 250 day 
estimation window -- measured from 295 days before each event to 45 days before it [-295, -
45] – and the standard one [-1,+1] and five day event window [-5,+1]. We follow the 
precedence of measuring CARs before the announcement to include pre-bid run-ups 
(Schwert, 1996) and afterwards to observe the effect of the event. If a merger was announced 
on a non-trading day, we code the subsequent trading day as the official announcement day.  
We retrieve the stock-market data necessary to complete an event study using Datastream. 
Data availability, at this point, reduces the sample of available deals to 1,542 deals. 
Performance Controls  
A number of factors are known to impact deal performance (see King et al., for a review). 
We control for: (1) the percent of the deal financed by cash (Percent Cash) and stock 
(Percent Stock) because Heron and Lie (2002) shows that cash-financed deals outperform 
stock-financed deals; (2) Acquirer Size, measured in thousands of employees, because 
Moeller et al (2004) show that larger acquirers make worse deals; (3) the Deal Size, because 
Moeller et al (2004) show that larger deals perform poorly. All the necessary data is collected 
from DataStream, and / or the SDC. We test each of the control variables for normality, and 
employ logs of all variables that fail the test. Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of the 
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data that we use in this study. All variables are winsorized, between 0.01% and 99.99%, to 
minimise the effect of possibly spurious outliers3. 
-- Insert Table 2 Here – 
Estimation 
We consider the impact of partner location using OLS techniques. In all estimations we 
cluster, at both the targets and acquiring industry, according to Froot (1989) and Wooldridge 
(2002), using both firms Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, to allow for industry 
effects. We also include year dummies, to account for year specific effects. We also adjust all 
standard errors for heteroskedasticity, using the Huber (1967) and White (1980) sandwich 
estimator of variance. Finally, and before interpreting the results, we confirm that multi-
collinearity is not an issue, using a variance inflation factor (VIF) test (Hair et al., 1992).  
 
RESULTS 
The Chinese Merger Market 
Figures 1, 2 and Table 3 report the growth and shape of the Chinese merger market. Figure 1 
illustrates the near exponential nature of the growth in the Chinese merger market; from 2 
deals in 1990, worth $38 million, to 3,261 deals in 2016, worth $661.3 billion. Figure 2 
provides a breakdown in the composition of the Chinese merger market. It reports that, 
despite the huge growth in the market, the willingness of the Chinese to internationalise 
                                                 
3 Winzoring is a technique for dealing with the effects of possibly spurious outliers. By winzoring 
between 0.01% and 99.99%, we set all data below the 0.01th percentile equal to the 0.01th percentile, 
and all data above the 99.99th percentile equal to the 99.99th percentile. The estimators that this 
creates are more robust to outliers, and by winzorising the data, we can make use of the full set.  
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remains low; in total, 91.4% of Chinese deals are domestic. Table 3 looks at the location of 
Chinese acquisitions that cross borders. It reports that 2.7% of Chinese deals (n=528) or 30% 
of Chinese international deals, involve targets in the Greater China region. Confucian targets 
(n=613) account for 35% of Chinese overseas acquisitions, and Asian targets (n=740) 
account for 42% of Chinese overseas acquisitions. Outside of Asia, Anglo-Saxon targets 
(n=566) account for the lions-share of the overseas acquisition (32%), with the United States 
(n=241) and Australia (n=167) standing out as popular non-Asian destinations, while 
Continental Europe (n=253) accounts for 14% of Chinese overseas acquisition, with Italy 
(n=44), Germany (n=42), and the Netherlands (n=22) as the most favoured destinations.   
-- Insert Figures 1, 2 and Table 3 Here – 
Partner Types and Performance  
Models 1-6, in Table 4, reports on how the choice of partner impacts performance. We report 
results using the [-5,+1] event window; the results using the [-1,+1] window are consistent 
and available from the authors upon request.  
Models 1-4 consider the specifics of Chinese acquisitions within Asia. Model 1, for example, 
tests the hypothesis that Chinese domestic deals outperform international deals. A positive 
and significant coefficient for the Domestic Target indicator provides support for this 
hypothesis; domestic deals perform 2.6% better than international deals. Model 2 adds the 
Greater China Target indicator to test the hypothesis that deals within the Greater China 
Region will outperform deals outside of the region, for reasons of cultural closeness. A 
negative and significant coefficient on the Greater China dummy forces us to reject this 
hypothesis. Model 3 adds the Confusion Target indicator to the equation, to test the 
hypothesis that Chinese acquisitions within the Confusion world outperform those outside the 
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region. A positive and significant coefficient provides supports for that hypothesis. Lastly, 
Model 4 adds the Asian Target indicator, to test the hypothesis that Asian targets outperform 
non-Asian targets; a positive and significant coefficient allows us to support that hypothesis.  
-- Insert Table 4 Here -- 
Next, Models 5-7 consider the specifics of Chinese acquisitions in the West, to test the 
hypothesis that Chinese acquirers will be able to create more value with targets based in 
Continental European governance systems, than targets in the Anglo-Saxon system. Model 5 
shows that Chinese Anglo-Saxon acquisitions destroy value, and Model 6 shows that Chinese 
Continental European acquisitions neither create value. Model 7 confirms these effects, when 
both indicators are included, and thus supports the suggestion that Chinese acquirers can do 
better deals in the Continental governance system than the Anglo-Saxon system. 
 
DISCUSSION  
Main Findings  
A number of the findings we presented above fit with our expectations / predictions, but a 
number of our other findings require some additional consideration. Our results suggest:  
(1) The Chinese merger market is booming and creating value 
The Chinese made 19,766 large (>$10m) acquisition between Jan 1990 and August 
2017, and the growth has been near exponential. In 1990, Chinese acquirers made 2 
large mergers and acquisitions; in 2016, they made 3,261 large acquisitions. Looking 
at the sub-sample for which we could calculate performance, we find that the Chinese 
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are, on average, creating value with their acquisitions. The average Chinese 
acquisition in the sample added 3.23% to the market value of the acquiring firm, and 
that almost 60% of Chinese acquisitions in the sample created value; Western samples 
usually report that 65-85% of acquisitions fail (McCarthy and Dolfsma, 2012).  
(2) We find mixed support for our proposed performance hierarchy 
A number of our expectations regarding the proposed performance hierarchy were 
confirmed, but a number of the results were quite unexpected.  We found:  
a. Domestic deals outperform international deals 
We expected and found that domestic deals outperformed international deals. 
The majority of Chinese acquisitions (91%) are domestic, and the evidence 
shows that domestic acquisitions create value; on average, domestic acquirers 
add +2.6% to the market value of the firm. This finding fits with the wider 
literature, which shows that domestic deals perform better (Chatterjee and Aw, 
2000; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).    
b. Acquisitions in the Greater China Region destroy value  
We expected that acquisitions in the Greater China region would be the next 
best thing to a domestic acquisition, but we find that these acquisitions 
actually destroy value. Understanding why requires additional research. It 
might be, however, that targets within the Greater China region are not 
sufficiently different to those on Mainland China to justify incurring the costs 
that come with the liability of distance, foreignness and outsidedness.  
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c. Confucian and Asian Targets add value  
We expected and found that both Confucian and Asian targets would add 
value to Chinese acquirers. Out results suggest that the average Confucian 
target adds 9.8% to the value of the market value of the acquiring Chinese 
firm. This seems to suggest that Chinese acquirers which step outside of the 
Greater China region, but remain within the Confucian world, add the most 
value. By contrast, Chinese acquisitions outside of the Confucian world, but 
within Asia, add value, but only add 1.3% to the acquirer, on average. 
Confucian targets, in other words, seems to be sufficiently different to justify 
internationalisation, but sufficiently similar to be easily integrated.  
d. Anglo-Saxon targets perform badly, and Continental targets are unspectacular  
Lastly, we expected that when cultural and geographic distances were equally 
high, Western targets with lower institutional hurdles would not only be 
preferred, but would demonstrate superior performance. We somewhat 
support this suggestion. Chinese acquisitions of Anglo-Saxon targets destroy 
value; the average Anglo-Saxon acquisition reduces the value of the acquiring 
firm by 3.1%. Chinese Continental European acquisitions perform better, but 
they neither create nor destroy value. We thus support the hypothesis, but find 
that while the Chinese do the worst with Anglo-Saxon targets,  they don’t do 
much better with Continental European targets.  
Together, these findings provide support for only parts of the proposed performance 
hierarchy. Our failure to support the entire hierarchy supports the suggestion that 
China is ‘different’ (Lin et al., 2009), and that Chinese mergers and acquisitions are 
20 
 
significantly different (Peng and Heath, 1996), insofar as the expectations derived 
from the literature, typically based upon the study of US acquirers (e.g., Hitt et al., 
2001; Moschieri and Campa, 2009), is not fully generalizable to Chinese firms. We 
support the calls, therefore, for additional comparative research (e.g., Lin et al., 2009; 
Yang et al., 2011; Nicolson and Salaber, 2013) to further test or to generalise Western 
findings, and to develop theories for emerging economies (Earley, 1989; Tsui, 2007).   
Limitations 
Our findings are subject to a number of important limitations. Firstly, we only consider large 
acquisitions, which we define to mean greater than $10 million. Such a restriction is put in 
place because smaller deals are known to perform differently (see e.g., Weitzel and 
McCarthy, 2011), and because the convention in the merger literature is to implement a 
minimum restriction.  In doing so, however, the generalizability of our results becomes 
unclear. Secondly, we do not consider the underlying motives behind the merger, which other 
have suggested are critical to understanding merger performance (Shrivastave, 1986; Bower, 
2001; Javidan et al., 2004; Schweizer, 2005). It may be, however, that Asian targets 
outperform Western targets, not because of cultural similarities and differences, but because 
there are more cost-cutting acquisition in Asian, and more revenue-expanding acquisition in 
the West. Additional research is required, we suggest, to investigate this possibility.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to document the emergence of the Chinese merger market, and 
to consider how the choice of partner – in terms of physical location – impacts performance.   
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Building upon a theoretical literature which suggest that international deals are more costly – 
in terms of the liabilities of ‘distance’ (Boeh and Beamish, 2012), ‘foreignness’ (Zaheer, 
1995) and ‘outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002) – we argued, firstly, that domestic 
Chinese acquisitions will outperform international deals and, secondly, that those 
international deals which incurred more of these liabilities would underperform those that 
incurred less. Effectively, therefore, the aim of this paper was to answer the calls of scholars 
looking to test the generalizability of the existing literature to emerging market firms (e.g., 
Earley, 1989; Tsui, 2007; Lin et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011; Nicolson and Salaber, 2013).  
Our results demonstrate that: (1) unlike Western firms, Chinese acquirers are creating value 
through mergers and acquisitions; (2) the literature only imperfectly applies to Chinese 
acquirers. We find that in most cases the performance of Chinese overseas acquisitions 
support the proposed performance hierarchy, but certainly not in all cases. Our failure to 
support the entire hierarchy supports the suggestion that China is ‘different’ (Lin et al., 2009; 
Peng and Heath, 1996), and that the existing literature is not fully generalizable. In doing so, 
we create a number of rich research opportunities for scholars looking to dig deeper into the 
largely unexplored field of linking Western literature to Chinese mergers and acquisitions.  
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Table 1 – The Partner Location Performance Hierarchy  
 
Liability Domestic 
International 
Asian Western 
Greater China Confucian Asian Continental Anglo Saxon 
 
Distance 
(Geographic costs) 
 
0 0 1 1 2 2 
 
Foreignness 
(Cultural and Institutional) 
 
0 1 1 2 2 3 
 
Outsidedness 
(Developing a position ) 
 
0 1 1 1 1 1 
Total additional Liabilities* 0 2 3 4 5 6 
* These numbers are, in themselves, meaningless, and arbitrary, and are intended merely to provide a rank indication. 
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Table 2 - Pairwise Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 CARs 0.05 0.11 -0.28 0.37 1.00 
           
                  2 Domestic Target 0.93 0.26 0 1 0.08 1.00 
          
      
[0.00] 
           3 Greater China Target 0.02 0.12 0 1 -0.07 -0.44 1.00 
         
      
[0.00] [0.00] 
          4 Confucian Target 0 0.05 0 1 0.03 -0.17 -0.01 1.00 
        
      
[0.19] [0.00] [0.80] 
         5 Asian Target  0.01 0.08 0 1 0.01 -0.27 -0.01 0.00 1.00 
       
      
[0.56] [0.00] [0.69] [0.88] 
        6 Anglo Saxon Target 0.03 0.16 0 1 -0.06 -0.60 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
      
      
[0.03] [0.00] [0.38] [0.74] [0.60] 
       7 Continental Target  0.01 0.12 0 1 -0.03 -0.42 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 1.00 
     
      
[0.21] [0.00] [0.54] [0.81] [0.71] [0.41] 
      8 Percent Cash  3.55 0.75 -4.2 4.61 -0.09 -0.14 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.04 1.00 
    
      
[0.00] [0.00] [0.09] [0.48] [0.05] [0.00] [0.06] 
     9 Percent Stock 4.4 0.25 1.59 4.61 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.00 -0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 1.00 
   
      
[0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [1.00] [0.00] [0.36] [0.89] [0.00] 
    10 Acquirer Size 7.35 1.45 0 13.14 -0.04 -0.10 -0.04 0.01 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
  
      
[0.11] [0.00] [0.08] [0.74] [0.02] [0.00] [0.59] [0.00] [0.87] 
   11 Deal Size  4.71 1.41 2.3 9.8 0.11 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.18 0.13 0.16 1.00 
 
      
[0.00]
 
[0.03] [0.00] [0.73] [0.64] [0.25] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
  12 Year 2012.
 
3.48 1995 2017 0.02 0.05 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 0.10 1.00 
      
[0.54] [0.05] [0.00] [0.03] [0.01] [0.24] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.09] [0.00] 
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Figure 1 – The Emergence of the Chinese Merger Market 
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Figure 2 – A Break Down of the Chinese Merger Market 
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Table 3 – The Global Distribution of Chinese Targets 
 
 
 
Number of Deals Percent Cumulative 
China Domestic 18,015 91.4 
 Greater China Region 528 2.7 94.1 
Hong Kong 495 
  Taiwan 28 
  Macau 5 
  Confucian Region  85 0.43 94.5 
Japan  29 
  South Korea 41 
  Mongolia 9 
  Vietnam  6 
  Asian Continent  127 0.64 95.1 
Indonesia 13 
  India 8 
  Laos 1 
  Malaysia 16 
  Pakistan 7 
  Philippines 5 
  Singapore 75 
  Sri Lanka 2 
  Anglo-Saxon 566 2.86 98 
Australia 167 
  Canada 80 
  New Zealand 14 
  United Kingdom 64 
  United States 241 
  Continental  253 1.28 99.28 
Austria 3 
  Belgium 9 
  Cyprus 1 
  Czech Republic 3 
  Denmark 4 
  Finland 5 
  France 36 
  Germany 42 
  Greece 3 
  Hungary 3 
  Ireland-Rep 3 
  Italy 44 
  Luxembourg 7 
  Malta 1 
  Netherlands 22 
  Norway 10 
  Poland 1 
  Portugal 3 
  Russian Fed 14 
  Serbia 4 
  Spain 16 
  Sweden 8 
  Switzerland 10 
  Other  200 
 
100 
Total 19,766 
 
100 
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Table 4 – Results  
        VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       
        Domestic Target 0.026*** 0.017* 0.021*** 0.022** 
   
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
   Greater China Target  
 
-0.044** -0.040* -0.039* 
   
  
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
   Confucian Target 
  
0.098** 0.099** 
   
   
(0.066) (0.066) 
   Asian Target 
   
0.013* 
   
    
(0.034) 
   Anglo-Saxon Target 
    
-0.031** 
 
-0.031** 
     
(0.014) 
 
(0.014) 
Continental Target 
     
-0.020 -0.021 
      
(0.022) (0.022) 
Per cent Stock Finance (log) 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Per cent Cash Finance -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Acquirer Size -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* -0.004* -0.003* -0.004* -0.003* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Deal Size 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Acquirer Industry Clusters Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Target Industry Clusters Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.022 -0.004 -0.008 -0.012 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) 
        Observations 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 1,542 
R-squared 0.025 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.023 0.022 0.024 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
